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OPINION

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
Vernon W. Hill, II (“Hill”), the former chairman and CEO of Commerce Bancorp,
Inc. (now Commerce Bancorp, LLC) (“Bancorp”), and Commerce Bank, N.A. (“Bank”),1
has sued Bancorp and Bank for breach of an employment agreement that triggered a
“golden parachute” payment when Hill was terminated. Bancorp informed Hill that it
could not make the golden parachute payment because it could not comply with the
certification requirement imposed by 12 C.F.R. § 359.4(a)(4) (“Golden Parachute
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Bancorp is the holding company; Bank is the wholly owned subsidiary. Bank has
since merged into TD Bank, N.A.
2

Regulation”). After a nine-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in Bancorp’s favor.
The District Court denied Hill’s motion for a new trial.
Hill has appealed several of the District Court’s orders. For the reasons set forth
below, we will affirm the rulings of the District Court.
I. Background
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the facts
necessary to the disposition of this appeal. In December 2006, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (“FRB”) notified Bancorp and Bank that the OCC and FRB each were
conducting an investigation. The matters under investigation by the OCC and FRB
included: “[p]otential conflicts of interest arising out of CEO/COB Vernon W. Hill [II],
his relatives, for example Shirley Hill, Robert Hill, Vernon W. Hill [III] and close
business associates as well as other insiders and insider related parties or entities in
branch transactions.” (Suppl. App. 93.) On June 28, 2007, Bank and the OCC entered
into a consent order, and Bancorp terminated Hill (effective July 31, 2007). The consent
order “ensure[s] that actual or apparent conflicts of interest or unsafe or unsound
practices involving the construction or acquisition of branch offices do not occur in the
future” (App. 170), as the OCC was concerned, inter alia, about Bank’s relationship with
Interarch, Inc., which, as Hill has explained, is an architectural and design firm that Hill’s
spouse founded.
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Hill thereafter sought his severance payment. Under the Golden Parachute
Regulation, in order for Hill’s severance payment to be made, Bancorp or Hill must
certify to the appropriate federal banking agency:
[T]hat it does not possess and is not aware of any information, evidence,
documents or other materials which would indicate that there is a
reasonable basis to believe, at the time such payment is proposed to be
made, that:
(i) [Hill] has committed any fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or
fiduciary duty, or insider abuse with regard to [Bank] that has had or is
likely to have a material adverse effect on [Bank]; [and]
(ii) [Hill] is substantially responsible for . . . the troubled condition, as
defined by applicable regulations of the appropriate federal banking
agency, of [Bank] . . . .
12 C.F.R. § 359.4(a)(4). Once that certification is submitted to the appropriate federal
banking agency, the agency must then determine whether to approve the severance
payment: the agency may decide not to take Bancorp at its word, but rather investigate,
inter alia, whether Hill committed any fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or
fiduciary duty, or insider abuse with regard to Bank. See id. § 359.4(b)(3). By
regulation, the payment cannot be made without this approval. See id. § 359.4(a)(1).
Neither Bancorp nor Hill filed a certification to enable Hill to receive his golden
parachute payment, and, in January 2008, Hill filed this lawsuit. By the time of the jury
trial, only two counts remained: breach of contract and contractual indemnification, each
asserted against only Bancorp. Bancorp stipulated that the elements of the breach of
contract claim were satisfied but raised the affirmative defense of legal impossibility,
contending that the Golden Parachute Regulation made it impossible to pay Hill his
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golden parachute payment. The jury heard evidence relating to this defense and rendered
a verdict in favor of Bancorp.
II. Discussion
“We review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings principally for abuse of
discretion.” Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002).
“We review questions of law de novo . . . .” Orabi v. Attorney Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 539
(3d Cir. 2014). Because none of the issues raised by Hill on appeal warrants reversal, we
will affirm.
A. Whether Expert Testimony Should Have Been Permitted To Discuss
Bancorp’s Financial Condition
We will first address Hill’s argument that expert testimony was improperly
excluded from trial. This testimony was offered to show that Bancorp was not in a
“troubled condition.” Hill argues that the District Court erred as a matter of law in
determining, at the summary judgment stage, that Bank was in a “troubled condition” as a
result of the June 2007 OCC consent order, urging that he should have been permitted to
adduce testimony from financial experts Paul Allen Schott and Michael Piracci regarding
the financial condition of Bancorp.2

2

In his notice of appeal, Hill does not list the March 1, 2012 order denying
summary judgment, notwithstanding that the summary judgment order is what
determined that Bank was in a “troubled condition.” See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) (“The
notice of appeal must . . . designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.”).
However, “there are circumstances under which we may review an order not specified in
the notice of appeal . . . .” HIP Heightened Independence & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth.,
693 F.3d 345, 351 (3d Cir. 2012). “[W]e can exercise jurisdiction over orders not
specified in the Notice of Appeal if: ‘(1) there is a connection between the specified and
unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3)
5

Pursuant to the statute on golden parachutes, “troubled condition” is defined at 12
U.S.C. § 1831i(f), which in turn provides that each appropriate federal banking agency
shall define the term by regulation. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(k)(4)(A)(ii)(III). The District
Court concluded that the relevant regulation was a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) regulation, which defines “troubled condition” as, inter alia, “any insured state
nonmember bank that . . . [i]s subject to a cease-and-desist order or written agreement
issued by either the FDIC or the appropriate state banking authority that requires action to
improve the financial condition of the bank.” 12 C.F.R. § 303.101(c)(3). Hill urges that
the second part of this definition—i.e., “requires action to improve the financial condition
of the bank”—was not met.
However, we conclude that the District Court applied the wrong regulation in
deciding whether Bank was in a “troubled condition.” Section 303.101(c) applies only
when the FDIC is the appropriate regulatory agency and the bank is a state nonmember

the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.’”
Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Polonski v.
Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998)).
Here, Hill has appealed the order excluding expert testimony, which is inherently
connected with the summary judgment order because it is based on that earlier order’s
determination that Bank was in a “troubled condition.” Hill’s intention to appeal the
summary judgment order is apparent because the section of Hill’s brief on this issue is
focused on whether the summary judgment order was correct in concluding that Bank
was in a “troubled condition.” Bancorp is not prejudiced because Bancorp has fully
briefed this issue. The parties were not even aware of this procedural difficulty until we
mentioned it at oral argument. Thus, we will consider whether Bank was in a “troubled
condition.”
6

bank. Id. § 303.101(c). Here, Bank was not a state nonmember bank. Instead, as Hill
concedes, Bank was a national banking association regulated by the OCC.3
The District Court’s error does not help Hill, as the correct OCC regulation, 12
C.F.R. § 5.51(c)(6), is more damaging for him than the FDIC regulation. Under the OCC
regulation, “[t]roubled condition” means, inter alia, a “national bank” that “[i]s subject to
a cease and desist order, a consent order, or a formal written agreement, unless otherwise
informed in writing by the OCC.” 12 C.F.R. § 5.51(c)(6)(ii). It contains no caveat
regarding whether the consent order requires the bank to take action to improve its
financial condition. Id. Here, the OCC and Bank entered into a consent order on June
28, 2007, and Bancorp terminated Hill on June 28, 2007, effective July 31, 2007. The
OCC did not inform Bank in writing that Bank was not in a “troubled condition.” Thus,
by definition, Bank was in a “troubled condition.” See id.
Given the applicable definition, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding expert testimony that Hill wished to use to cast doubt on whether Bancorp was
in fact in a “troubled condition.”

3

Hill urges that the OCC regulation does not apply because the OCC does not
regulate Bancorp and because the regulation purportedly relates only to changes in
officers and directors. These arguments are easily dismissed. By virtue of 12 C.F.R.
§ 359.0(b), the OCC regulation also applies to Bancorp. See 12 C.F.R. § 359.0(b)
(applying the golden parachute provisions derivatively to “healthy holding companies
which seek to enter into contracts to pay or to make golden parachute payments to
[institution-affiliated parties] of a troubled insured depository institution subsidiary”).
Hill’s argument that the OCC regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 5.51(c)(6), concerns only changes
in directors and officers under 12 U.S.C. § 1831i is belied by Congress’s decision to
include a cross-reference in the statute on golden parachutes, thereby borrowing the
“definition in the regulations prescribed pursuant to [12 U.S.C. § 1831i(f)].” 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(k)(4)(A)(ii)(III).
7

B. Whether the District Court Abused Its Discretion in Permitting Testimony
Prior to trial, Hill moved to conduct more than ten depositions of Bancorp’s
former directors to explore Bancorp’s impossibility defense. The magistrate judge denied
this motion. After discovery closed, Bancorp sought to call the former directors as trial
witnesses. Hill objected, and the magistrate judge determined that it would be unfair and
prejudicial to permit the directors to testify at trial, considering that a prior ruling had
barred Hill from taking their depositions. The magistrate judge ruled, however, that the
directors could testify for Bancorp at trial if Bancorp allowed Hill to take a two-hour
deposition of each individual witness. The magistrate judge concluded that Hill would
not be prejudiced by permitting the directors to testify if he were allowed to depose them
in advance, as Hill then would not suffer unfair surprise. Hill appealed the magistrate
judge’s decision, and the District Court affirmed.
Because Hill was permitted to depose the directors and in fact did depose them
before trial, this issue is easily resolved. The magistrate judge and District Court did not
abuse their discretion in allowing the former directors to testify at trial. The magistrate
judge properly applied the five-factor test identified in Meyers v. Pennypack Woods
Home Ownership Ass’n, 559 F.2d 894, 904-05 (3d Cir. 1977), overruled on other
grounds by Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985) in deciding
ultimately to permit the directors’ testimony, considering: (1) the prejudice or surprise to
the party against whom the evidence was offered; (2) the ability of the injured party to
cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood the admission of the late evidence would disrupt the
orderly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the court; (4) the bad faith or
8

willfulness in failing to comply with the District Court’s orders; and (5) the importance of
the evidence to the proffering party. He also considered, “the fact that ‘[t]he Third
Circuit has, on several occasions, manifested a distinct aversion to the exclusion of
important testimony absent evidence of extreme neglect or bad faith on the part of the
proponent of the testimony.” (App. 9 (quoting ABB Air Preheater, Inc. v. Regenerative
Envtl. Equip. Co., 167 F.R.D. 669, 671 (D.N.J. 1996)).)
On appeal, Hill focuses exclusively on one of these five factors: bad faith in
preventing Hill from deposing the directors earlier.4 We find no evidence of bad faith in
the record and would, in any event, be hard-pressed to reverse for abuse of discretion
based on one factor of a five-factor test. The magistrate judge’s requirement that Hill
first be permitted to depose the directors before they testified cured any prejudice, and the
trial was not disrupted. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the
magistrate judge’s ruling.
C. Whether Denying the Motion To Amend the Final Pretrial Order Was an
Abuse of Discretion
Hill argues that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Hill’s motion to
amend the final pretrial order to include the former directors as witnesses in Hill’s casein-chief. The magistrate judge concluded that what the former directors said in their
depositions was “not a surprise” and that the directors’ testimony provided “just

Specifically, Hill alleges that Bancorp engaged in a “bait and switch” tactic by
objecting to Hill’s earlier request to depose the directors. Originally unable to depose the
directors, Hill instead deposed Bancorp’s Rule 30(b)(6) representative. Hill claims that
the directors’ testimony contradicted the Rule 30(b)(6) representative’s testimony.
Bancorp persuasively argues that the witnesses’ testimony was not contradictory.
4
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cumulative evidence, in the Court’s view.” (Suppl. App. 90.) The District Court
affirmed, finding that Hill had known “for years that these members of the Board would
say that they wanted the Bank to pay Mr. Hill.” (Id. at 104.)
A court may grant leave to amend a final pretrial order “only to prevent manifest
injustice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). Here, Hill has failed to show that manifest injustice
ensued. Bancorp had identified the former directors in its Rule 26 disclosures, and Hill
was still able to cross-examine the directors at trial. Considering that Hill’s motion to
amend was made on the eve of trial, we hold that the refusal to amend the final pretrial
order was not an abuse of discretion.
D. Whether Giving the Supplemental Jury Instruction Was an Abuse of
Discretion
The District Court’s jury instructions provided that Bancorp “may make a Golden
Parachute payment to plaintiff, Vernon Hill, of the monies owed Mr. Hill under the
party’s employment agreement only if the applicable Federal banking agencies determine
that the payment is permissible.” (2d Suppl. App. 33.) After hearing this and other
instructions, the jury began deliberations. More than an hour into the jury’s deliberation,
the jury came to the Court with a question: “If we award for the plaintiff does this bypass
federal approval?” (Suppl. App. 234.) The District Court called the jury back into court
and stated, “The best way to answer that question is to tell you [12 C.F.R. §] 359 of
which you’re all experts now, states that the Bank cannot pay money to Mr. Hill without
approval of the Federal regulators. I hope that answers your question.” (Id. at 236.) Hill
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urged that this instruction was error and that a new trial was required. The District Court
disagreed.
This Court reviews supplemental jury instructions for abuse of discretion, meaning
that Hill “must show that the [District] Court’s action was ‘arbitrary, fanciful or clearly
unreasonable.’” United States v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Stich v. United States, 730 F.2d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 1984)). We “review the supplemental
instruction given not in artificial isolation, but . . . in the context of the overall charge.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 192 (3d Cir.
2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In denying Hill’s motion for new trial, the District Court gave myriad reasons to
explain why the supplemental jury instruction was not improper. For instance, the
supplemental jury instruction did not inject an irrelevant issue into the case, as “[t]he one
thing that’s crystal clear about this case is that everybody talked about [12 C.F.R.
§] 359.” (Suppl. App. 239.) Further, “there’s absolutely no evidence whatsoever that the
answer that [the District Court] gave in any way had any bearing whatsoever on the
[verdict],” and “[n]o evidence whatsoever” that the supplemental jury instruction was
incorrect. (Id. at 239-40.) According to the District Court, the supplemental jury
instruction served a purpose of correcting a statement that Hill’s counsel made at the end
of his summation that the jurors could have misinterpreted as “an invitation to ignore
[§] 359’s prohibition,” which would have been impermissible. (Id. at 241.) Further, “I
don’t know how the jury could possibly feel that I was telling them they couldn’t award a
verdict on monetary damages . . . .” (Id.)
11

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving the supplemental jury
instruction. The District Court’s supplemental jury instruction was consistent with a
prior jury instruction—specifically that Bancorp “may make a Golden Parachute payment
to [Hill] of the monies owed [Hill] under the party’s employment agreement only if the
applicable Federal banking agencies determine that the payment is permissible.” (2d
Suppl. App. 33.) Hill never objected to this prior jury instruction, nor did he offer an
instruction in order to elucidate to the jury Hill’s position that there was an alternative
way by which Hill could be paid. Considering the full context and prior jury instruction,
the District Court’s reference to the regulation that was central to the trial is not so
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
III. Conclusion
We affirm: (1) the August 1, 2013 order denying Hill’s motion for a new trial; (2)
the May 22, 2013 order entering final judgment in favor of Bancorp on the jury verdict;
(3) the District Court’s trial rulings regarding admission of evidence, jury instructions
and the jurors’ question; (4) the April 25, 2013 order denying Hill leave to file for
summary judgment; (5) the April 19, 24, and 26, 2013 orders denying Hill’s motions to
amend the joint final pre-trial order; (6) the February 15, 2013 order denying Hill’s
motion for reconsideration and ordering other relief; and (7) the April 26, 2012 order
regarding admissibility of expert testimony. Further, we affirm the March 1, 2012 order
deciding summary judgment to the extent that it is at issue in this appeal.
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